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The following text was scanned from the Khe Sanh Veterans Newsletter; Special

Issue: 30th Anniversary of the Hill Battles at Khe Sanh. Ray Stubbe compiled the

text from official records and personal narratives of those involved.

(The scanning process has some flaws. There may be some spelling errors and unit

designations may be

incorrect in some cases. I am in the process of manually comparing and editing

the text, but wanted to

make this information available as soon as possible. The corrected version will

be available soon.)

BACKGROUND

The importance of Khe Sanh relates to an opening in the rugged mountain chain

that forms a natural boundary between Laos and South Vietnam known as the D'Ai

Lao. Two other passes to the north, Mu Gia (WE 8153) and Ban Karai (XE 262117)

provided access to NVA units moving south relatively unimpeded along what came

to be known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The D'Ai Lao (the pass through which Route

9 passes to and from Laos) had been an ancient invasion route, used in 1282 when

the warrior Chams in Vietnam moved westward. (Note: the tactical maps show KSCB

as "Xom Cham," or "village of Chams"), in 1666, when Vietnamese extended their

influence into Laos, in 1827 by Siamese moving east, pushing the Vietnamese to

Cam Lo. Road construction beginning in 1904 under Capt. Odend'Hall made it into

Route 9.

As development of the Ho Chi Minh trail progressed, the Laotian town of Tchepone

on Route 9 was overrun in May, 1961, and, being concerned over a "porous

border," the Americans placed a Special Forces "A" team in Khe Sanh ville on 8

July 1962, lest penetrating NVA troops and supplies have free access into

Vietnam. The Bru tribe, covering both sides of the border, became a natural

source of information for Americans on what was happening on the Ho Chi Minh

Trail, as did the local French coffee plantation owners who traveled westward on

Route 9 to Savannakhet in Laos. An airstrip (later KSCB) was developed by ARVN

engineers in Nov-Dec of '62.

Then came 1964.

On 26 Mar, Capt. Floyd Thompson (CO of the Khe Sanh "A" team) was captured and

became the longest-held

POW of the war. On 20 Apr, Eugene Poilane, who had established a coffee

plantation at Khe Sanh in 1918 and fathered 10 children, 5 of whom were born

after he was 60, was assassinated on Route 9. In late '64, the USSF relocated to

the airstrip and began construction of several bunkers (which Marines later

assumed were "old French bunkers").

On 22 Dec '65, the Special Forces at Khe Sanh made a chance contact in a dense

fog with a large NVA patrol and annihilated them. The NVA retaliated on 03 Jan

'66 by shelling the new camp with 120mm mortars, the first use of these larger

caliber weapons in the war.

By now, Khe Sanh now was important not as a plug in a hole to stop NVA from

moving into South Vietnam, but rather as a launch site for American

intelligence-gathering operations into Laos. The pass made it possible to move

in and out clandestinely by foot. A whole host of such activities soon

flourished: in 1964 Signal Engineer Survey Unit commanded by Maj. Alfred M.

Gray, Jr., conducted operations from Tiger Tooth Mt (Hill 1739, XD 832543).

Special Forces established agent nets, as did the National Police in Khe Sanh

ville. The Air Force started TIGERHOUND-small prop aircraft to do VR. The CIA

(or, in Vietnam, CAS) established JTAD station #14 (Joint Technical Advisory

Detachment) at Khe Sanh, using former NVA who had been "turned around" for deep,

unsupervised patrols. The SOG's FOB-I at Phu Bai used Khe Sanh as a Launch Site

by 1966.

Results of these activities prompted Gen. Westmoreland to coax III MAF to

upgrade the Khe Sanh airstrip and emplace BN 1/3 there in Oct '66. Project

DELTA, operating just under the DMZ and east of the border, sustained 3

MIA in Dec '66. The USSF relocated to Lang Vei 19-25 Dec '66.

NVA presence in the Khe Sanh area increased; Khe Sanh was the nest from which

the hornets stung them in Laos. (Gen. Giap was always interested in the area. He

had been imprisoned at the prison at the D'Ai Lao, known as Lao Bao, 19301932

along with his brother Nho, a prison so harsh that prisoners rarely returned

from it).

Contacts became more frequent. On 18 Jan '67, Cpl Michael John Scanlon of the 3d

Force Recon Co Det became the first USMC KIA at Khe Sanh. As a result of a

contact 26-27 Jan, 4 USMC helicopters were lost. BN 1/9 arrived at Khe Sanh on 6

Feb '67 and made contact 25 Feb just 1500 meters west of the airstrip. Force

Recon patrols reported significant NVA presence. On 16 Mar, the newly arrived

E/219 made contact in which 18 Marines were KIA. USAF pilots of TIGERHOUND

reported: "an alarming buildup of fortifications and NVA activity on the hills

overlooking the base."

Yet, the base commander was convinced there was little or no NVA presence or

activity.

One of the SOG team leaders training indigenous for patrols into Laos conducted

training patrols for his indigenous at Khe Sanh, including Hills 881-North and

South and 861. During a brief of the Khe Sanh commander, he reported numerous

bunkers, lots of enemy, and recommended the hills be subject to "..many, many

hours of prepping with airstrikes. Then I would form my artillery and I would

lay a barrage and walk my troops up with a barrage of artillery in front of us.

This Marine officer looked around and said, 'Bullshit!' And the Captain looked

at me and said, 'Well, Sergeant, our briefing is completed.' We turned around

and walked out of there. And it was about a week, the Marines sent a Company up

on that hill."

24 April

First and Third Platoons of B/1/9 were operating from PPBs at XD 798443 and XD

790455, one just west of Hill 861, the other a click northwest. The Second

Platoon provided defense of the KSCB.

Like the descent into monsters within a nightmare, the mission was to check out

some caves that had been spotted by B-l about 1630H on 23 Apr. Tom Ryan, Point

man of B-3, later reflected: "The Colonel on the base had said, 'We'll just send

up two platoons, one on each side, and we're going to clean them up once and for

all.' It was crazy!" The two platoons joined together about 1800H and set in for

the night at XD 810460. It was not restful; Cpl Michael A. Brown, a MG team

leader of B-3 recalls: "We set in our perimeter. We weren't too sure. We were

kinda nervous then. We knew we were moving into a VC area. Anyway, we set up our

PPB there, out there in the open with First Platoon."

On the morning of the 24th, the two platoons moved out at 0530H in two columns

about 300 meters apart following a path they had used on previous patrols in

this area, moving towards Hill 516 (XD 799459). It was raining, and some Marines

in the patrol were able to eat some Cs as they moved. "The area was pretty open.

We moved out. There was no contact. The trail was kinda rough but we made it. We

kept on humping. Then we moved up this hill. I'm not sure which hill it was. I

guess it was around 861 and finally we were moving into this area with the grass

pretty thick, and we weren't sure we were going to make any contact or not. A

couple of guys were saying, 'Well, there probably won't be anything there when

we get there.' I knew myself that if there was anything there, it wouldn't be

anything they wanted."

As B-l moved towards the caves, one of the men in 3d Squad of B-l spotted 4 or 5

NVA in khaki uniforms moving towards the Marines. The platoon commander, 2/Lt

James D. Carter, Jr., passed the word for the platoon to hold fast since they

were advancing towards them. The enemy force moved up to within 50 meters,

spotted one of the Marines, and began to fire. The Marines opened fire. After

the exchange of bullets, Lt Carter took 8 men with him to investigate. He found

an enemy soldier on a stretcher, killed him and one other enemy trooper down the

hill. The First Squad Leader, Cpl James Gerald Pomerleau, was perhaps too

anxious to get to the enemy, and was hit by a WP grenade and killed. B-l brought

the body of Cpl Pomerleau back up the hill and proceeded some 300 meters towards

Hill 861 when they began receiving heavy fire, pinning them down.

In order to cover their movement out of the enemy's direct fire, LCPL Eric G.

Wilk of B-3 moved his 60mm mortar directly into a position exposed to enemy MG

fire and began firing. His mortar effectively silenced the murderous fire on B-l

and they were able to pull across the ridge to a position of defilade from the

enemy fire. Immediately, the numerically superior enemy force shifted its

vicious fire toward the advancing B-3 and specifically as LCPL Wilk's mortar

position which was causing them so much damage with repeated accurate fire.

Without a moment of hesitation, LCPL Wilk boldly moved his weapon to a more

effective position and again directed accurate counterfire, enabling his platoon

to regroup into defensive positions. LCPL John Wayne Skelton, Jr., began running

through the intense fire to obtain vital mortars after the ammunition carriers

were unable to deliver ammunition due to the heavy volume of small arms fire and

mortar fire. Repeatedly exposing himself to the enemy fire, he moved one man to

another, collecting ammunition and delivering it to LCPL Wilk. Despite the heavy

MG fire directed on him, LCPL Wilk continued to fire and only stopped when a MG

round shattered his right forearm making him unable to continue. LCPL Skelton

then continued to fire the mortar until he was seriously wounded by the heavy

volume of enemy fire.

Meanwhile, in B-l, LCPL Dana Cornell Darnell, a mortar ammunition carrier, saw

his mortar gunner fall unconscious when the ambush was sprung. With

extraordinary calmness in the face of the intense enemy fire, LCPL Darnell

retrieved the mortar.

LCPL Darnell had yelled for the ammunition which had been distributed among the

platoon's members to be delivered to his position. Due to the intense enemy fire

the other members of the platoon were unable to reach his position with the

necessary ammunition. LCPL Darnell immediately stood up and raced through the

enemy fire to retrieve the ammunition, with complete disregard for his own

safety. Due to the urgency of the situation he was unable to set up the mortar

properly. Holding the mortar between his legs and steadying it with his hands

and using his helmet as a baseplate, LCPL Darnell began firing the mortar from a

position exposed to the enemy fire and delivered accurate fire into the enemy

positions. His A-Gunner urinated on Darnell's hands and the tube to keep it

cool. When he had exhausted all of the mortar rounds of the mortar

squad, LCPL Darnell informed the rest of the platoon to standby; he was coming

around to collect more ammunition. He stood up and again raced up and down the

lines collecting mortar ammunition and then returned to his mortar, all the

while being subject to hostile fire. This was repeated several times until the

enemy fire was silenced.

At this time, the First Platoon was ordered to withdraw from the clearing. While

withdrawing, two Marines in close proximity to LCPL Darnell were hit by MG fire.

He quickly moved through the fire to render first aid and was dragging wounded

Marines from the clearing when he was temporarily blinded by dirt and rock

fragments which embedded in his eyes. He refused to be evacuated and within an

hour was again caring for the wounded. When the radioman for the Third Squad was

killed, LCPL Darnell took over the radio as the platoon withdrew.

The chaos of the battle momentarily settled, but not the disorienting confusion.

Corporal Brown, a MG team leader of B-3 recalls, "We didn't know which place we

were supposed to be in, where we were going to set down at. We just moved in as

clumsy as we could. We tried to figure out where the fire was coming from."

B-l was then ordered to leave their KIA with B-3 and join up with BRAVO-6, Capt

Sayers. Two men at the time started moving to where they could find some cover;

no one had any real cover at this time. The mission was to assist B-2, which had

lost four men.

Early on the morning of the 24th, 2Lt Thomas G. King had led 30 men from B-2

plus a 81mm mortar section with approximately 120 rounds of mortar ammo and ILt

Phillip H. Sauer, commander of the ONTOS section at Khe Sanh, to Hill 700, about

a click south of 861, to provide security for the sweeping I -I and B-3.

Upon reaching XD 805435, Lt King set up his 81 and at about 0930H, began to fire

into the cave area. About an hour later, he dispatched a 5-man OP to proceed up

the trail to the top of Hill 861 for a better advantage so they could call fire

missions and possibly air support for the two platoons. The OP advanced until it

reached a bamboo thicket about 300 meters from the top of the hill, at 1100H,

and was ambushed by dug-in 20-30 NVA. The point man went down yelling, "I'm

hit!" and just lay on the trail. Lt Sauer and PFC William Marks made it to a

foxhole; the radioman and security took cover about 15 feet behind them. The NVA

soldiers began plastering them with fire. Lt Sauer was armed with only a pistol.

Marks' rifle had become caked with mud and was giving him trouble. A NVA round

had burst the muzzle of the security man's rifle; it was worthless.

Marks and the Lt decided to make a run for it. Sauer said he'd cover Marks and

follow him back to the others.

"I took off and it was the last I ever saw of him. When I got to the other two I

said, 'Come on let's get out of here,' and we ran down as far as we could and

went down again, the fire was so heavy. But we got up and began running again.

We saw the gooks shadowing us downhill on our right side and I thought they had

us surrounded. I thought we were all going to die right there. We were running

scarred." The radioman was hit in the chest and went down. The security man

disappeared. Marks found himself alone, running blindly, stumbling and falling

along the narrow and slick mud path as bullets hit all around him.

The squad security for the 81 moved forward to investigate, and Marks stumbled

into them. Breathless, exhausted, and caked with mud, he blurted, "They're all

dead. The other four. All dead." When he made it to his unit, he was given some

asprins and told to lie down and rest. He couldn't. "I kept seeing those poor

guy's faces." Lt King immediately dispatched one of his squads to retrieve the 4

bodies. They arrived at the ambush site and had their hands on two of the

bodies; they did not see the other two. Due to the very heavy fire, the squad

was forced to withdraw, and Lt King proceeded to call an artillery mission on

Hill 861 where it was assumed the NVA were dug-in.

At this point Capt Sayers radioed Lt King and said he was on his way by

helicopter. The approach of his helicopter was met with .50 caliber MG fire, but

managed to land with Capt Sayers and his radioman and take-off. Lt King

immediately turned the 81 tube around and fired on the .50. One enemy body flew

into the air. A squad dispatched to investiage could locate nothing. When the

squad returned, Lt King and nine Marines went to the ambush site on 861, took no

fire, and managed to get to the two bodies and drag them back. One body had been

stripped of everything but boots, utility trousers, and utility jacket. The

other body was stripped and had nothing but a cartridge belt, a couple of

canteens, and flak jacket.

For about 20 minutes, the squad combed through the immediate area searching for

the two others, without success. Perhaps they had crawled away, they thought. Lt

King then requested permission from Capt Sayers to pull back:

"I did not like this area. It was too very quiet. There was no bugs making any

kind of noise, no noises whatsoever, and I figured the enemy was still up in

that area." Upon reaching a suitable area, he called in a helicopter to evacuate

the two bodies. "I came up on the helicopter's frequency, and he instructed me

to pop a smoke. I popped one smoke. The helicopter circled high overhead. He

instructed me to pop another smoke, which I did. The helicopter, which was a 34,

proceeded to land. His wheels had no more than touched the ground when the whole

tree line on top of 861 opened up on us with heavy automatic weapons fire. The

helicopter took 35 hits. None of my people were hit; we all got down." The

firing slowed down somewhat as Lt King returned to Capt Sayers and the 81 tubes

which continued to support the sweeping B-l and B-3. The FO of B-l radioed that

the rounds were landing directly on top of a NVA company, and to keep firing.

B-l had been moving towards 861, as ordered, but was ambushed with heavy

automatic MG fire; there was another man killed, another wounded. The platoon

disengaged, moved to a LZ, and was able to medevac two or three of their wounded

by helicopter. Receiving additional heavy fire, the platoon moved to another LZ.

Another chopper arrived, but so did heavy enemy fire; another man was killed,

three more wounded. The chopper could not land. So B-l set in for the night, dug

in with their wounded and dead. "It was raining. It was miserable. It was cold.

I was in Korea too, and I wonder to this day which one was worse." [GySgt Al

Koppel, Weapons Plt Cdr, B/l/9]

B-3, the other sweeping platoon, fared no better. After B-l left them with the

body of Cpl Pomerleau, Cpl Brown recalled, "We stood around there. We couldn't

figure out whether we were supposed to set in or not." Three or four minutes

passed. All at once they started receiving fire-small arms, mortars, .30 and

.50-from the ridge line opposite them, and everyone jumped down. The Marines of

B-3 moved to the treeline at the crest of their hill and tried to return fire.

"Nobody knew exactly how we were doing it. We just moved up into the brush, sat

down, and started firing. We were firing, and I could see a couple of muzzle

flashes from the bushes up ahead, but it was hard to pinpoint the fire. It

seemed maybe they were dug in. We were firing back and forth for awhile and the

rounds were coming close. We didn't have any trouble. We had concealment, but

once we fired, our concealment was literally no good because they could see

where [the bullets were coming from, I didn't know what was going on. We heard a

couple of guys get hit, and they were screaming and it kinda shook us up. We

didn't know what the hell happened. We kept on firing. Finally they told us to

pull back and just leave half our gear up there. We tried to bring it with us

but it was almost impossible to keep moving and pick up everything you had and

keep our packs on our backs. We found out who the casualties were and the

corpsman was working with them, and we were trying to figure out what we were

going to do with the gear, and it was the mortar section that got hit. A couple

of the guys-. One of them seemed to be all right at first. He was on his feet.

He was running. Then the next thing I knew he was laying down. He was

unconscious. The other guy got hit. He was hit twice in the leg and in the arm.

It tore up his arm pretty bad, but he never let down his spirits. He kept his

morale up. He had two morphine shots and it didn't seem like it put him out. He

was still conscious and he felt every bit of the pain it seemed."

They started to move off the hill but were having trouble transporting the

wounded in makeshift stretchers. One of the machinegunners gave up his MG and

started to carry a wounded man on his back, a man from the rockets squad who had

been hit in his legs. They continued down the path trying to locate a LZ. The

NVA attempted to mortar the Marines, but their aim was fortunately inaccurate.

Nevertheless, as Cpl Brown recalls, "Most of us were scarred. We were just glad

to get away from there. But we weren't running to anything. We weren't actually

getting away from anything. We were still in it." The Marines moved down a

trail, but paused since the corpsman was having trouble with causalties to the

rear. Friendly aircraft began dropping bombs on the hill-very close to B-3. "We

got bombed by our jets up there. My squad got 6 people killed. They were blowing

up the whole top of the hill with mortars. They were just telling me to move

quick-running down there, more or less falling, and the jets bombed us, blew my

whole fire team away. I think they thought we were the enemy the way we were

coming off that hill." Two more bombs came too late: "We lost radio contact with

the platoon commander, and the word was passed back to me-I was about in the

middle of the formation-that some people had been injured by the bombs and they

needed a corpsman up there badly. So we passed the word back for a corpsman. The

corpsman came up, and we moved back to this area that had been bombed, and

around this area we saw various gear scattered all over the area, and parts of

bodies all over the area, and we were told to move past this area so that the

platoon sergeant could move up and stay with this may who was dying. And the man

wouldn't die right off, so we got the word to pick him up with all-most-of the

gear we could carry and the wounded, and move down to this LZ area.

It was about 1700H when Capt J.A. House of HMM-265, who had been piloting a

routine respply for some 4 hours, was alerted for an emergency medical

evacuation. Capt House and his co-pilot, Capt J. J. Dalton, proceeded along with

his wingman, Capt Nick, to B-1 and B-3 for the medevac. Capt Nick approached the

LZ occipied by B-l on the very top of Hill 861. As soon as the helicopter landed

in the zone, the enemy opened fire. "We got three of them aboard. We got every

window in the cockpit shot-out right there. We also had an armorpiercing round

in our forward transmission. As we landed [at KSCB] the transmission froze.

Neither one of us were hit. My Gunner got hit in the knee- took a 12.7 in the

knee. I think we got one wounded and two bodies out before we got out of there.

My job as the co-pilot was to watch the fire and get the ramp down. I started to

call in the fire. We were facing the horse-shoe ridge on 861, and the fire

started on the left and went all the way around."

Capt House then proceeded to B-3's position (XD 804453) which was supposed to be

in defilade from the enemy. However, as they landed in the zone they began

receiving intense enemy fire from the ridge line to their right. The zone was

also obstructed by trees and stumps. Immediately upon setting down, the aircraft

came under fire from an automatic weapon at the three o'clock position and the

Crew Chief, LCPL Daniel Douglas Dulude, returned fire with the .50. Upon

observing that there was no fire from the 9 o'clock position and that the side

of the hill made it improbable that fire would come from that side, the Gunner,

SSgt G.L. Logan, began loading for the Crew Chief and the first medevac crawled

into the aircraft on his hands and knees.

LCPL Dulude motioned for SSgt Logan to take over the gun while he assisted the

wounded man aboard the chopper. He then learned that there was no one to help

the wounded to the aircraft except other wounded, and that the casualties were

on a small hill about 25 meters from the chopper. With automatic weapons fire

striking around the aircraft and without regard for his own personal safety,

LCPL Dulude departed the aircraft and dashed into 12 - 14 foot high elephant

grass to aid the wounded. The height of the grass made it impossible for him to

see the aircraft after moving about 15 meters. He returned with one of the

wounded men and courageously set out to help the next man. Returning again he

turned around and once again left the aircraft to return to the wounded. At this

point, during his second trip to help the wounded, the enemy began to mortar the

zone. At least 6 mortars fell in close to the aircraft and the area in which

LCPL Dulude was working. Although the enemy small arms fire and AW fire was

intense, LCPL Dulude continued his efforts, disregarding his own personal

safety. He returned to the aircraft a third time and once more ran back into the

zone. Finding the last man, LCPL Dulude again returned to the aircraft. Then he

made certain there were no other casualties remaining in the zone. Only when he

was certain all the wounded were aboard did he reenter the aircraft and inform

the pilot that they were clear to lift-out. Although exhausted, he refused rest

and immediately began administering first aid to the wounded enroute to the

medical facility.

That night B-1 and B-3 dug in as best they could. They had no E-tools, and dug

their foxholes using canteen cups and bayonets. They had been traveling light-no

packs, only cartridge belts. One Sergeant in B-3, shot in his legs, kept telling

everyone, "We are all going to die!" Surprisingly they were not assaulted that

night. Airstrikes and artillery pounded the areas around them and 861 for most

of the night.

At B-2's position, having exhausted the 81 ammo, Capt Sayers pulled back to Khe

Sanh with the mortar team and squad security just prior to darkness.

Casualties for 24 Apr were: 14 USMC KIA, 18 WIA, and 2 MIA, 5 NVA KIA

(confirmed) and 100 KIA (probable). Support for 24 Apr: 660 rounds of 105mm and

8 fixed wing SORTIEs dropping 6500 pounds of ordnance.

DECIMATION IN THE FOG 25 April 1967

The plan for 25 Apr was to move K/3/3 and the 3/3 Command Group to Khe Sanh to

conduct a Battalion-minus operation with B/1/9. K/313 had been scheduled to

relieve B/1/9 on 29 Apr, and liaison personnel of 3/3 were already at Khe Sanh

on the 24th. Intentions were for B/l/9 to evacuate their casualties during the

morning and sweep toward Hill 861 from the northwest.

Fog was to determine much of the day's activity rather than plans. At 0815H, B-3

was preparing their ammunition and gear when suddenly someone shouted, "Look

back! Look back! Hey, come here!" A NVA soldier had walked right up to Tom Ryan,

the Point Man of the platoon, to surrender, saying he wanted to quit; he was

going home.

"I couldn't believe it; they were actually talking to a Gook! So I wanted to run

for my life because I thought we were surrounded. We tied him up good, put a

blindfold on him, stuck stuff into his mouth. We just sat there and waited and

wondered. Maybe we were spotted; we didn't know. We just sat there."

The captured NVA soldier, Vu Van Tich, later stated that he was a member of 4th

Battalion, 32d Regiment, and that he had lefl his unit 4 days prior to his

surrender.

A medevac of the casualties was attempted. As the first chopper landed in the

zone, it encountered a hail of small arms fire. The chopper rifled off

immediately, but not before Capt Sayers had debarked and several evacuees

embarked, including the POW. This was the only helicopter able to reach B/l/9 on

25 Apr due to the fog. Thereafler B/l/9 commenced movement along the trail south

and east to Hill 861 (XD 803443).

B-3 was moving to link up with their "6." Sgt Rios began leading the men down a

gully and up to the ridge line to Capt Sayers, avoiding the path were they had

been hit the previous day. But the vegetation was so thick that afler half an

hour, they had only moved less than 10 meters. The Sgt then decided the only

possible route was the trail, to take the chance of gening ambushed, but to be

very alert.

As they moved, they discovered a lot of gear plus about 3 bodies. The progress

was halted as the bodies and the gear was retrieved. The humping, the anxiety of

battle and always-possible death, and the lack of water they themselves had,

made all of the Marines dangerously dessicated and weaker by the moment. The

dead bodies, however, still had some canteens of the precious water which they

could swallow. Even in death, the Marines at Khe Sanh shared what they had with

each other. It was now about 1730 or 1800 and the fog was so thick that

visibility was restricted to about 5 meters.

"We got on top of the hill. We set up stretchers for these dead people, and we

started to move off. We got down the trail approximately 50 meters. There was a

dead man laying there. So they passed the word back to the formation that the

last three men were to pick up this dead man and carry him along. They were

supposed to pass the word up when it was time to move out, but we were trying to

get the man arranged, to get a liner for him and word was passed to move out. We

passed the word up that he wasn't ready. Word was passed 'we're moving out

anyway,' so we moved out. We got about 75 meters on the other side of this dead

person and the word was passed that we were supposed to go back and get this

man."

The fog was, by now, very, very thick, and it was also dark. "We told them the

fog was so thick we couldn't even find the path to get back there, and so we

decided that we would move on. We had about 3 KIAs with us already."

B-3 moved about 30 more meters, dropped their KIAs, and set up a perimeter for

the evening.

B-l, still separated from B-3 during the 25th, had been able to evacuate their

wounded on the medevac helicopter, but not their dead, and also moved all day

until about 2100H with their dead- through the extremely torourous and muddy

terrain, although completely exhausted, with no food and little water.

Fog delayed movement of the 3/3 Command Group under command of LtCol Gary Wilder

and Co K/3/3, commanded by Capt Bayliss L. Spivey, from Thon Son Lam to Khe Sanh

until noon on the 25th, at which time 3/3 assumed OPCON of B/l/9. Capt Sayers

had managed to depart KSCB just minutes earlier. LtCol Wilder later noted: "So I

got another company up that was attached to me, and by the time the Company got

up there, late in the evening, I was able to brief the Company Commander. I had

the unpleasant task of telling him that he had to march in, using stealth, and

join-up with the remnants of those two platoons in the middle of those three

hills, probably heavily-occupied." LtCol Gary Wilder had commanded 3d Recon Bn

(reinforced with 1st and 3rd Force Recon Cos) whose patrols had detected the

influx of the NVA 324B Division north and west of Dong Ha Operation HASTINGS was

launched as a result and 1995 NVA were confirmed KIA. Now, LtCol Wilder was CO

of 3/3. Col John Lanigan, CO of 3d Marines, had decided to replace B/l/9 with

3/3 since Khe Sanh was very active as a base for launching

intelligence-gathering units into Laos to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and

especially the portion of it that stemmed north from Route 9, just east of BV33,

parallel to the border, and then crossed into the DMZ, known as the "Sante Fe

Trail."

Numerous patrols of Marine Force Recon and B/l/9 infantry had disclosed the

presence of major NVA units in the Khe Sanh area but the base commander at the

time refused to believe these reports. Wilder noted: "When the base commander

briefed me when I went up initially for the coordination on the change, he said,

'There are only 30'-and I remember these things eventhough it's a long time ago.

He said, 'There are 30 VCs operating in our area. They have 2 82mm mortars, but

they only have one baseplate.' When he was finished, I said, 'Do you really

believe yourself what you just told me?' He said, 'What do you mean!? Of course!

We have good intelligence.' I said, 'You're talking to the former Division

Reconnaissance Officer. Stop that!' But he honestly believed it. During the

operation I got ahold of one of my recon Sergeants who had been up there for

some time, and I said, 'Sergeant, what the hell's going on up there?' And his

words were, 'Sir, I've been trying to tell that *** for two months that we got

North Vietnamese crawling all over these hills, and he wouldn't believe me."'

Capt Spivey, CO of K/3/3 since 02 Apr 67, received the mission from LtCol Wilder

to take Hill 861 and be prepared to continue to the northwest to aid B/l/9 and

exploit their contact. K/3/3 jumped off in the attack from KSCB by foot at noon

and commenced artillery prep of Hill 861. At 1410H the hill at XD 813430 was

reached and the company, now about 3/4ths of the 5,000 meters from KSCB to 861,

deployed for the final attack: two platoons separated to go up the two ridge

lines approaching the hill from the south. K-3 was to continue north to XD

806445 (a hill later called "861-A" during the Siege) and be prepared to assist

K-1 and the Co Ha which moved northwest directly on to 861. K-2, along with the

60mm mortar section, remained as security for the Bn CP to cover the company's

approach to the objective. K-2 was at XD811431.

By 1445H, K-l and the Co Hq had reached a position at XD 804438. The advance was

checked at this point to permit K-3 to progress to a supporting distance along

the ridge to the east. Also, a final artillery prep was requested. At 1525H, K-3

was at the desired position at XD 808439. Artillery check fire was in effect

throughout this time. Up to this time, K13/3 had received no contact, and at

1615H, Capt Spivey requested to continue the attack without further prep fires.

Permission was granted. By 1630H, K-3 had reached its objective at XD 806445 and

was ordered to establish a blocking position to the southwest.

K-1 and K-3 were not physically tied-in due to the very small width of the hill

approaches and extremely steep sides.

K-l moved up the ridgeline directly south of the summit of 861 while K-3 moved

on a ridge line moving into the objective from the east to support K- I 's

advance. At precisely 1705H-Capt Spivey recalls the exact time- lead elements of

K-l, then some 300 meters from the summit, began to receive fire from enemy

bunkers on top of the hill as well as mortars from a reverse slope defense. Due

to the nature of the concave slope and the brush, the Marines never had good

observation of the enemy position, but poured a large volume of M-79, LAW, and

small arms into the general area.

Although they advanced to about 100 meters of the crest by 1730H, they had run

out of troops. Only 10 effectives remained in K-l; there were 15 Marines killed

and another 15 WIA. The number of dead and wounded made disengagement

impossible.

When the First Squad leader was mortally wounded, LCPL Raymond Lee Huckins

immediately assumed command, reorganized the squad and aggressively continued

the assault. When the enemy fire increased and temporarily halted the unit's

advance, LCPL Huckins, discovering a critical shortage of ammo, fearlessly

exposed himself to the enemy fire to distribute ammo and assist in rendering

first aid to the casualties. As he moved among his men, encouraging them, an

enemy grenade landed within a few feet of him and two other Marines.

Disregarding his own safety and with outstanding presence of mind, he picked up

the grenade and hurled it away a few seconds before it exploded.

Cpl Stoney Jackson received painful leg wounds but refused medical evacuation

and continued to lead his men.

The corpsman of K-l, HM3 Michael G. Gibbs, immediately moved to the forefront,

into the heat of the battle, and began to treat a Marine with a sucking chest

wound and then moved him 15 meters to a safer location, He then exposed himself

again to the intense fire to assist a second Marine. While administering first

aid, he was wounded in his back, but continued to help the wounded Marine.

Having completed treatment for the second Marine, he moved to a third, but

received a wound that broke his leg. He was then pinned down under fire where he

quietly remained until darkness, when he and the others were moved to a more

secure area. [HM3 Gibbs was KIA the following morning during a mortar attack].

[On 07 Jul '67, a Marine of W/1/13 on Hill 861 was digging a position near the

LZ and uncovered a wallet containing personal effects and ID of HM3 Michael G.

Gibbs].

Capt Spivey requested that LtCol Wilder release the reserve platoon, K-2, which

was then in the vicinity of the Bn CP group. As K-2 advanced towards the

decimated K-l, K-3 was ordered forward on the crest from the east but reported

slow progress in the saddle northeast of Hill 861; they reached XD 804444 and

were held up for the night. B/l/9 was moving towards K-l from the west slope of

861.

The sun was setting along with their hopes. Darkness was setting in, along with

the darkness of the unknown, the fear and the terror. The Marines were just

under the enemy positions, and Capt Spivey was unable to extract K-l from the

immediate contact with the enemy. All of the wounded of K-l, however, were

recovered into its lines along with all but 4 of those killed.

By 1830H, K-2 had arrived at K-l's position and began to recover the 4 KIA, but

two additional casualties were taken in the process, and the anempt was

discontinued. During this time there were numerous acts of heroism as the very

young Marines went about, in the fact of heavy enemy fire, dragging the wounded

and dead to safer positions.

LCPL Harold Allan Croft, for example, without hesitation, moved through the

exploding mortars and automatic weapons fire to assist HM3 Gibbs. He then began

crawling around the hillside giving medical aid to the wounded. At times he

appeared to be everywhere, administering aid, giving encouragement, and serving

as an inspiration to all present. In one instance, during a pause in the enemy

mortar attack, PFC Croft exposed himself to heavy MG fire to administer first

aid to LCPL Oliver, a victim of mortar shrapnel. PFC Croft applied battle

dressings to the head and leg of LCPL Oliver and then dragged him to safety.

Every time someone yelled "Corpsman!" PFC Croft ran out of his hole, knowing the

corpsman was already busy, to apply banle dressings and drag the wounded to

safety

.

Since the first contact at 1705H, incoming mortars were received in volleys of 3

to 5, falling at first to the south, but were walked up the ridge. Most of the

rounds continued to fall a little behind the position, but several were on

target, producing additional casualties. Counter-mortar and artillery seemed to

have lime effect. Apparently the enemy mortars were dug in on the reverse slope

making artillery fire ineffective.

The command group withdrew a short distance, but PFC Floyd Allen Gregory, the

Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) rep, remained forward to assist communications

personnel maintain vital contact with subordinate and higher echelons.

During the night, K1313 maintained its positions under sporadic fire as all dug

in, in place. About 0200H, they spotted rockets and mortars being fired from GS

7943, a position to their west, being fired on KSCB. Artillery was fired

accurately on target, and C-47 SPOOKY later arrived on station to spew its venom

of fire.

LtCol Gary Wilder notes: "..this is the most interesting aspect of all: during

that night, they rocketed Khe Sanh-or tried to. Now we saw the rockets going up

and going over. I remember talking on the phone like I'm talking to you-I'm

talking to the Khe Sanh base as the rockets are going over my head, saying,

'Pull your head in; they're coming in!' Now fortunately I programmed a flare

plane to be on station that night, which was one of the old C-47s equipped with

mini-guns. The minute the rockets started going up, I vectored him and he

started hosing down with the miniguns. The thing was quieted-down very quickly.

But the interesting thing was-I found out the next day- there had been a

coordinated attack that took place on every northern base in the I Corps area at

the same time, right to the minute. So we subsequently pieced-together-the

intelligence people-that we believe that they had planned that night to take Khe

Sanh. And it makes alot of sense, because there was but an infantry platoon and

some reinforcements. And it was only by the accident of those Marines walking up

Hill 861 that triggered all of this action prematurely."

Col Wilder continues: "They moved a whole Division into Laos, and subsequently

moved a Regiment of that Division in to occupy those three hills. I think the

plan was that that Regiment was going to hold the three hills and they were

going to pass another one or two Regiments through them and take Khe Sanh. The

intelligence that came back said that the first regiment that had occupied those

hills had been virtually annihilated. The second regiment was involved in the

counter-attack, and they were written-off. So it's two of the three regiments

were wiped-out for all intensive purposes." (But this is getting at the end of

the story!)

During the afternoon of the 25th, recon team 3AI, HAWK, made contact with 10 -

15 NVA west of their position (XD 762505), a ridgeline beside a dead tree about

30 meters from a treeline which ran across the ridge.

"Around one o'clock we started hearing the noise coming up this hill. We were in

a well camouflaged little jungle area on a knoll. It was a flank movement coming

up that hill. They were all helmeted, geared and combat

ready. They had elephant grass over them for camouflage. Closer and closer the

enemy came. They got within 50 ft. We were wellconcealed on higher ground. Cpl

Robert Wacker, the Squad Leader, squeezed the trigger. It was a mix-fire! It

sounded almost like a fire-cracker. Our adrenelin was really going. The next

guy, Rudy, opened up and we got those guys, no problem. The problem was what was

behind those guys. It must have been a company, and they started to open

up-small arms, MG fire. They had us pinned down real bad. Then something

happened.

"I don't know if it was a 82mm mortar or a hand grenade. it hit right above us;

it got every one of us. Terry Burton, who was right next to me, was completely

unconscious-looked like someone took an ice-pick to him. "Another guy came

crawling up to me and said, 'Baker, we got to get out.' This was after about 15,

20 minutes of fire-fighting. We were getting low on ammo. We had placed our

K-bars in front of us, and were fixin' to go hand-to-hand. He said, 'The

Assistant Squad Leader, Rudy, told me to tell you to get out.' "Well, I didn't

want to go! I knew there'd be a MG because we were getting fire from three

sides. In my haste in going out I tripped the M-21, and I started a fire. I mean

it was burning, and I tried to put it out with my hands. So I knew I was going

to die, and being a religious man I told God, 'God, if you give me one more

chance, I will stop my evil ways.' I knew I was going to die. Well, fortunately

for me there was nothing out that way at the time."

Two choppers of HMM-265 landed to extract the team. The first, piloted by Capt

Petteys, made his pass too fast and his guns jammed; he waved off. His wingman,

Capt J.A. House, II, rolled in behind him and slid in along the ridgeline. His

helicopter, EP- 173, immediately drew automatic weapons fire, but he was about

75 meters from the recon team. LCPL Daniel D. Dulude, the Crew Chief, knelt on

the open rear ramp of the aircraft where he was exposed to the direct enemy fire

only 75 meters away and calmly directed Capt House through a difficult backtaxi

maneuver towards the team.

Fred Baker, a member of HAWK, along with another man, Pete, dashed back and

forth carrying everyone. Six men of HAWK were badly wounded or unconscious; 2

were still able to move. Also assisting the wounded recon team members to the

chopper under the heavy enemy fire was the Crew Chief, Daniel D. Dulude: "The

enemy were in the beeline and were firing AKs and throwing hand grenades at the

team. It seemed as if we had misjudged our chances of retrieving them. The point

is rather vivid in my mind because the transmission on the helicopter had been

leaking transmission fluid on the ramp and made it extremely difficult for one

person to crawl up. I remember the two of us [Dulude and Baker] pushing the

medevac up the ramp in what seemed like an eternity. We then left to help two

others. Our paths led us to different wounded and we made our way back to the

helo on our own. At this point a count of Marines on board indicated that there

were 3 missing. Two were wounded and the third was Baker who had already started

back for one of them. I again left the plane to gather the last wounded man. We

took another count, raised the rear ramp, and left the zone." The entire team

was medevaced to DaNang. After HAWK was extracted, Huey guns hips strafed the

suspected enemy positions in the beeline causing one secondary explosion.

Due to the action at Khe Sanh, Co K/3/9, commanded by Capt Jerrald E. Giles, was

flown into Khe Sanh from Camp Carroll.

Like so many troopers who came to Khe Sanh, LCPL Henry Rose, Jr., a squad leader

in Weapons Platoon, K/3/9, recalls: "..at first nobody knew where we were going.

We knew we were going somewhere because my company was the reactionary company

for anything that came up." Marines were jostled from one place to another

during their tours in Viet Nam until all the places and events and days merged

into a very confused and tangled web of experience as impenetrable as a bamboo

thicket, out of which it was impossible to make any sense, only nightmares. from

images seared on the soul.

3d Marines at Khe Sanh assumed OPCON of K/3/9 at 250830H. The Marines were now

sending companies to Khe Sanh piecemeal into the meat grinder of battle: E/2/9,

B/l/9, K/3/3, and now K/3/9. The opinion held by the higher echelons of the

Marine command that there really was no enemy at Khe Sanh, had become the

perception that precipitated death. Capt Spivey on the Combat Base the 24th as

B/l/9 was experiencing its contact remarked, "No one suspected more than

probably a NVA company in the area at that time." Of course, the extremely

rugged terrain precluded any large mass movement of troop formations. The hills

of Khe Sanh dictated how we would maneuver.

Reconstruction of the NVA plan by FMFPAC reflected isolation of the battlefield

by mortar attacks on Dong Ha, Gio Linh, Con Thien, and Camp Carroll, all

designated to upset Marine fire support and logistic arrangements. A mortar

attack on Phu Bai would endanger helicopter support,

while blowing away bridges and key stretches of Route 9 would sever overland

logistic supply. In addition, a diversionary attack on the Lang Vei camp, four

miles west of Khe Sanh near the Laotian border, would make the enemy threat

appear to be focused there. As LtGen Krulak's summary put it: "All this was to

be ancillary to the main effort, a strong ground attack on Khe Sanh, coming

southward from the mountainous region near the Laos-RVN-DMZ corner."

Later analysis through contacts, prisoner interrogation, and captured documents,

reflected that the 18th Regiment of the NVA 325C Division had moved into the

operational area from Laos early in April under cover of fog and heavy cloud

conditions. The mission was to attack Khe Sanh. The regiment occupied the

triangle shaped key terrain in the area bounded by Hill 861 (XD 803443), Hill

881-South (XD 777437), and Hill 881-North (XD 774457). A prisoner reported that

the regiment was supported by the 2d Artillery Battalion armed with ten 120mm

mortars and ten 75mm recoilless rifles.

AGONY 26 April 1967

26 April began with the 3/3 CP (at XD 805434) receiving approx. 200 rounds of 82

at 0500H. Simultaneously, KSCB received 55 rounds of 82 and 55 rounds of 75 RR

fire, most of which landed outside the perimeter. A flareship with miniguns was

called on station, delivering a massive volume of fire on suspected enemy

positions and movements. There were no casualties as a result of this action.

B/l/9 was close enough to the NVA RRs to see and hear their backblast in the

fog. Located on the eastern slope of 881-S, Capt Sayers silenced them by

directing artillery on them by sound. By 105mm artillery illumination and holes

in the fog, destruction of the recoilless rifles was confirmed. The fog was in

layers at the time; the hill masses were covered and the valleys were clear.

The sun arose on the Marines of K/3/3 still in place on 861, pinned down by the

NVA. Capt Spivey noticed, however, that by 0615H, K-3's presence in close

proximity to the enemy's northeast was apparently still undetected. Shortly

before first light, K-3 was ordered forward in an attempt to take the enemy

position from that direction. K-1 and K-2 were alerted to move out on order,

pending developments of K-3's advance.

2/Lt Curtis L. Frisbie led his K-3 of Marines forward, exercising stealth, until

the enemy positions could be observed and voices heard. By 0815H preparations

for the assault were being made when the platoon came under an intense volume of

automatic weapons fire and grenades. The platoon immediately sustained

casualties; Lt Frisbie was seriously wounded and subsequently medevaced.

By this time it had also become apparent that B/1/9's platoons were a

considerable distance to the west and could not influence the action. it was

also apparent to Capt Spivey that he just did not have the horsepower to

overcome the extensive and well-organized defense on Hill 861. Due to the

close-in fighting, no supporting arms could effectively contribute to the

action.

Capt Spivey asked LtCol Wilder for permission to disengage K-3 who was not hit

too bad at that time. Wilder agreed, and K-3 pulled back to a secure LZ to

extract their wounded. The only access to the area secured for helicopter

evacuation was across an open, grassy finger ridgeline exposed to enemy sniper

fire from Hill 861 for over 100 meters. The fire was well-placed and frequently

heavy. LCPL Miller was one of those wounded in the initial attack, and he had

been left behind. PFC Brenton Wilford Allaire, without being told to do so,

along with Cpl Contreras, returned to Hill 861 and helped him to safety. As the

MGs and snipers opened up on the 100 meters of exposed area, PFC Allaire along

with LCPL Barry Lee Duncan continued 5 more trips across the fire-swept area,

dragging wounded comrades to safety as well as gather up all the rockets

deposited along the trail while pulling the wounded to safety. Each time they

drew fire, but kept returning. On one occasion, LCPL Duncan aided a Marine to

safety who was unable to walk.

PFC Thomas M. Barrow, Jr. and LCPL Lester Larry Menke also assisted the wounded

to safety. On two separate occasions, LCPL Menke successfully bravaed the

concentrated fire to move his fellow Marines to safety. As he maneuvered through

the fire-swept area a third time, he was painfully wounded in his leg. Despite

his wound, LCPL Menke continued trying to get the man across to safety. After

about 10 meters he was again wounded. Another Marine relieved him of his burden,

and LCPL Menke began crawling with all his gear and without assistance to the LZ

where he was evacuated.

Meanwhile Capt Spivey requested Huey gunship support to assist him in

disengaging K-l and K-2 and evacuate their dead and wounded. Gunships arrived

about 1030H and provided outstanding support in close proximity to the front

lines, and the platoons were able to disengage moving about 25 meters at a time

down the hill. Moving down all the dead, wounded and all the gear was difficult,

but by leap-frogging short distances and displacing the security, he was able to

gather all the wounded and all the dead except 4 which had been ahead of their

lines.

At 0800H, K/3/9 moved out from KSCB and at 261315H, a platoon of K/3/9 linked up

with K/3/3(-) at XD 805437, down from the crest of the hill. LCPL Larry W.

Umstead, grenadier with Ist Squad, Third Platoon of K/3/9, noted: "Just as we

reached the base of Hill 861 we noticed that there was alot of gear laying

around-there were signs there was pretty heavy fighting all up and down the side

of the hill. As we approached, we could see them bringing down some of the

wounded and dead. And alot of the men, as they were coming down, were telling us

not to go up, how bad it was up there-there's no water, no nothing, and how well

the VC were dug in." From there it was fairly easy going back on into the

command group position, south of Hill 861. By 1600EI, all elements of First and

Second Platoons were within the 3/3 Command Group's position and medevacs

completed. At about 1900H, Third Platoon linked up with the remainder of the

company at XD 806444.

The company, with elements of K/3/9, established a perimeter defense on the

night of 26/27 April and returned to Khe Sanh the morning of 27 April, arriving

by 1100H. After collecting all their gear and equipment, what remained of K/3/3

boarded aircraft and returned to Dong Ha. There had been 19 men killed from K/

3/3, including two corpsmen and one who later died of wounds, two who were MIA,

36 wounded (evacuated) and 6 wounded (not evacuated. One of those medevaced,

Daniel A. Wisley, a squad leader, was greeted with the news: "Your wife just

gave birth to twins and she is doing fine." The remaining Marines of B/1/9 did

not fare well during the 26th.

B-3 dispatched a fire team of 5 Marines to retrieve the body they had passed the

previous afternoon. They were only gone about 5 minutes when they became

involved in a fire-fight. The rest of the platoon gathered their fighting gear

and quickly moved to where they were, a path on top of a slope. As the platoon

moved, they located one dead man and another wounded in his foot. They attempted

to fire a few LAWs, but they misfired. Sgt Rios passed the word to return to

where they left their gear. While moving, another man was hit in the leg,

breaking it. In about 30 seconds they had on all their gear and began to move

up, carrying and dragging whatever they could, fired at by an enemy

malchinegunner. They moved from about 0800H until they met up with their "6" and

parts of B-1 and B-2 at about 1030H. The rest of B/l/9 had begun the day at

0700H attem ting to move east along the trail leading to 861 and immediately

encountered enemy resistance (at XD 795449). B-1 and B-3 linked up at 0840H at

XD 802443. Enemy small arms fire coupled with sporadic mortar fire succeeded in

limiting B/1/9's advance to a bitterly contested struggle for each foot of

terrain.

Capt Glen Golden's F/2/12 artillery battery found Capt Sayers in the fog by

walking artillery rounds to him, and them and then put a "ring of steel" around

the company that was so tight he was taking dirt from the impact. "It was the

most professional and accurate piece of artillery work that I have ever seen. No

doubt it saved our lives," noted Capt Sayers.

SSgt Leon R. Burns, Platoon Sgt of B-2, described the progress of the day in an

interview conducted 8 May 1967, while all was fresh in his mind: ".. at dawn we

moved out. We were still heading for Hill 861. We got to a small hill

approximately 500 meters to the west of it. We got to the top of it. We took a

few sniper rounds. We started down the far side, and then the stuff really hit

the fan. The Third Platoon had managed to link up with the First, and my people

were in the middle with the CP group. As they started down off this hill,

getting right up to the very base of 861, they came under heavy automatic fire.

At this time the First Platoon leader was wounded and about four or five other

men. I lost one of my squad leaders and the M79 man. Also, one of my

machine-gunners, LCPL Puleo, he spotted an enemy machinegun. He fired on it with

his rifle, and I'm told that he knocked out at least three NVA. In doing so, he

exposed himself to quite a bit of fire. He lost his left thumb and was wounded

isn the left side in two or three places. One of the machinegunners, PFC

DeKaney-we got some incoming mortars, and he was hit in the face. Sergeant

Orton, my squad leader, he was up front. He was cut in half by a burst from a

machinegun, and his M79 man, PFC Hare, was hit by an automatic weapon and a

mortar. About that time, one of my men, PFC Blitz, was down there. He was

anywhere and everywhere, doing anything that had to be done. Weighs about 150

pounds; he's a big man. He got down there, started putting dressings on people.

My corpsman come up, and about this time my corpsman was shot pretty hard in the

leg and in the cheek of his ass. This made him a casualty. We got some people

down therer to get him out. The CP group was right in the middle. And at one

time the company commander was down there with a couple of his radiomen getting

these people up almost a sheer cliff. They were wounded or were dead. At about

the time they got two men up, we had an Air Force OE come over, who were doing

an outstanding job for us, and he fired one of his snake rockets, just missing

the company commander, Capt Sayers, and just by a couple of feet. We managed to

tell him that we were friendly, and he started looking for other targets."

The Marines of B/l/9 began receiving close air support as napalm (DELTA-9s) and

250-pound bombs (DELTA-Is) blasted the back side of 861.

It was becoming apparent that some of the wounded would have to be medevaced or

die. Cpl Payne and Cpl Brown were sent back off the hill to a little ridgeline

to start setting up a perimeter for a LZ to evacuate the 5 dead and 15 wounded

(at XD 803444). The helicopter came in. SSgt Burns tossed a smoke grenade,

walked off, and started waving the chopper into the zone. He had already

arranged 3 men to each wounded and warned them to move quickly because incoming

was certain; the LZ was in full view from 861. Each of the groups picked up a

wounded man and raced towards the chopper. The chopper just sat down. One

wounded man got aboard, and an incoming mortar round exploded. SSgt Burns had to

wave the chopper off:

"This was the only time we had a chopper around us that could possibly handle

us. We had many wounded, but we just couldn't get a chopper to get them out. The

chopper left. Things started getting worse. We started catching mortar rounds

coming in again near our LZ."

The Company now moved like a mob, everyone just grabbing a wounded man, and

headed for the edge of the hill. After the first 10 men moved over the

ridgeline, the Marines were blasted by enemy mortars: "Everyone just hit the

deck wherever they were and hoped they didn't get hit. And in this thing some

wounded men got killed." One of those was Cpl Troy David Payne, Jr. Cpl Payne

had not been with B/l/9 when it left KSCB. He had a cold and was on light duty.

A Marine Corps General landed at Khe Sanh to receive instructions on how to get

to the scene of the battle once B/1/9 made contact. In a characteristic Marine

move, Cpl Payne boldly climbed aboard the General's helicopter and accompanied

him to the action, where he joined his unit.

Upon reaching the battlefield, Cpl Payne carried wounded to the LZ and fought

off repeated enemy attacks with the

weapons he picked up from his injured comrades. Now, at this point, Cpl Payne

moved right to the center of the impact areas to aid the stricken men to safer

positions. He even used his own body to shield other wounded Marines from mortar

fragments. He was hit. He died that others might live. He was awarded a Bronze

Star Medal.

Some of the wounded, such as LCPL Puelo and PFC DeKaney, were again wounded. The

situation seemed impossible. Capt Sayers reported at 1445H to LtCol Wilder's S-3

that he had so many casualties that he couldn't move. The S-3 said Capt Sayers

should abandon the dead and just bring out his wounded. Capt Sayers replied that

he couldn't even move with his wounded and that he would assume a defensive

posture, move into the fog, and fight until it was all over.

Carrying the casualties, now for 3 days, had been an onerous agony. Capt Sayers

later wrote: "We were carrying KlAs and WlAs in ponchos four men to a litter.

The heat deteriorated the bodies rapidly and they bloated fast. Almost

impossible to carry in the dark, the mud and the rain. Many times we stopped our

march to retrieve a body that had fallen out of a poncho and rolled down a hill.

Identification was difficult. KIA tags were lost. It was not until we arrived

back at Khe Sanh and matched our company roster with the evacuation list was I

convinced that we had not left a fellow Marine in the hills."

Cpl Frank D. Thompson of B- I reflected the emotion by his silence during an

interview conducted 10 Oct 1967 by official USMC Oral History personnel:

Thompson: All this time- three days, carrying KIAs and WIAs with us.

Interviewer: What did you think about that?

Thompson: It was bad, but we had to do it.

Interviewer: It was a bad situation, then. What did you feel about it and what

did the other people feel about it? What did they think?

Thompson: [LONG SILENCE. NO RESPONSE.]

Inteviewer: Did they think it was a hopeless situation?

Thompson: It was-.

Interviewer: Were the people scarred? Were the Marines scarred?

Thompson: You're always scarred when you're getting shot at.

Night was fast approaching, and SSgt Burns suggested making

some stretchers. Some of the men cut poles for

stretchers, and about this time, 1800H, reached B/l/9: "About

this time we had some visitors, some very nice

people from K/3/9. The Company Commander was with one of his

platoons. We were all overjoyed to

see them. They had water; we had none. We gave the water to our

wounded, and we prepared to leave the

area."

The 7-man recon unit of K/3/9 gave all the water they had, and their corpsmen

began attending their wounded. After all the wounded and dead were staged in one

area, litters were made, and the Marines moved out.

"We had so many wounded and dead and extra gear to carry that everyone was

carrying something except for the point and rear guard. As we moved out it

started to rain and a very large amount of fog. The fog locked us in. Maybe it

was a God-send because the NVA couldn't see us. They fired a few spasmodic

mortar rounds but they really didn't do anything. We moved out. I was bringing

up the rear. I had one machinegunner with his gun, the assistant machinegunners,

and my company commander, bringing up the rear. The company commander of K/ 3/9

was there also a good portion of the time. Everybody carried his load; we

carried as much gear as we possibly could. The radiomen eventhough they were

carrying a PRC-25, still carried people on stretchers. The going was very slow.

It was muddy. At one time it rained extremely hard. Maybe this was good in one

sense because we did manage to get some water for both us and the wounded. We

left a very wellbeaten trail. Why the NVA didn't follow us I don't know."

The Marines humped all through the night, in all the hardfalling rain, through

all the slippery and cling-to-boots mud, slipping and sliding with their

makeshift stretchers, carrying our sorrows, into all the enemy-infested area,

carrying all their dead- weary, in shock, and finally about 0500H arrived at the

3/3 CP (at XD 805428). They were told they could have one hour to sleep and get

water for the wounded and the other men that didn't have any.

Choppers arrived at dawn to evacuate wounded, dead, and gear. SSgt Bums had gone

out with 22 men; he resumed with 8. On the other hand, the newly-arrived Marines

were in such great quantity, like a mass of ants, that Tom Ryan, point man with

3-3, looked out and "I remember coming down offthat hill; as far as I could see

there was Marines. I mean they were coming in and landing all over the sides of

the hills and stuff. As far as I could see! Looked like everybody in the world!

Looked like thousands of them!"

Those remaining in B/1/9 walked back into Khe Sanh. Trucks were available for

the move, but the remnants of B/1/9 chose to walk. It was a matter of pride

after 4 days of constant enemy contact.

2Lt James D. Carter, Jr., wounded with shrapnel in his upper arm and cheek on

the hospital ship, USS SANCTUARY later wrote Capt Sayers: "..t lose young men,

their tremendous will to live, and their ability and courage under fire would be

hard to match.. It's surprising any of us got out of there alive considering the

odds- that's hard charging Marines for you, though."

As a result of the Khe Sanh battle, Gen Bruno A. Hochmuth choppered the SLF, BLT

2/3, commanded by LtCol E.R. DeLong, then conducting Operation BEACON STAR, back

to its parent regiment. Picked up in the middle of operations the moming of 26

Apr, 2/3 was transported by helicopter and fixed wing to Khe Sanh. The lead

elements (E1213) arrived at noon. G1213 and the CP group arrived at 1320H. The

command group and two companies commenced movement by foot march to the

objective area at 1445H. H/2/3, the third and last company to be moved to Khe

Sanh on 26 Apr, arrived at 1600H and commenced movment in trace of 2/3 at 1620H.

All 2/3 units arrived in the objective area and set in for the night at 2120H to

the east of 3/3 (near XD 812431). F/2/3 was scheduled to arrive at Khe Sanh on

27 Apr.

Supporting arms for 26 Apr consisted of 1076 rounds of artillery and 20 air

SORTIEs delivering 58,000 pounds ordnance.

Casualties for 26 Apr: from B/ 1/9: 6 KIA and 14 WIA, and from 3/3: 5 KIA and 24

WIA.

POSTURING 27 April 1967

An AO flying overhead early in the morning of 27 Apr sighted 15 - 20 NVA manning

an OP outside a bunker at XD 782448 at 081 SH; two hours later he sighted a

large gun approx. 6-ft. Iong on wheels approximately 3-ft. in diameter, at XD

785450.

All units of 3/3 moved into close proximity shortly after first light on the

27th, and medevac of casualties was completed by 270727H. Thereafter, 3/3

commenced overland movement to the KSCB perimeter, arriving at 1130H.

At 1400H, 3d Mar CHOPed M/3/3 and M/3/9 to SOP KHE SANH. M/3/3 arrived at 1610H

to replace K/3/3 which departed at 1500H to Thon Son Lam (the "Rock Pile").

M/3/9 arrived at 1730H to replace B/l/9 which departed at 1630H. What remained

of B/l/9 flew out of KSCB on one C-130 to Dong Ha and then trucked out to Camp

Carroll that night. Several days later, they were listening on their radios to

the action at Khe Sanh, how all the thousands they'd seen were running into

trouble: "We couldn't believe it. We were all looking at each other and saying,

'What the hell did we run in to!?"'

In addition, the remaining company of the SLF, F/2/3, arrived at Khe Sanh and

assumed the mission of reserve. B/1/12, the SLF battery, arrived at 1900H and

was laid and ready to fire by 2150H. 2/3 realigned itself during 27 Apr while

assisting in the neutralization of Hill 861 by supporting arms. 2/3 remained to

the south of the hill (at XD 812432) with the companies oriented to the west of

the command group.

Two recon inserts were attempted on 27 Apr to provide surveillance to the west

and north of the battle area.

At 1245H, Capt Don McPheron, pilot of a section of aircraft (EP- 171 ) and his

wingman, ILt Thomas P. Berry, took off from Khe Sanh to insert a recon team.

After completing this, they again took off from Khe Sanh at 1315H for a second

recon team insertion. They were to insert team BREAKER at XD 723443. Two

KLONDIKE gunships from VMO-6 located the zone, reported it appeared to be

satisfactory, and made some low passes. Capt McPheron entered the zone while Lt

Thomas Berry remained in a 2000-ft. orbit overhead. On touchdown, Capt

McPheron's aircraft received heavy automatic weapons fire from a beeline only 10

yards from his aircraft. Although Capt McPheron attempted to depart, his

aircraft became uncontrollable and crashed into the 2800-ft. high zone. Since Lt

Berry was carrying 4 recon troops he was unable to make an immediate pick-up of

the 9 survivors of the crash. He proceeded directly to KSCB, Offloaded the

passengers, and retumed to the zone. The 9 survivors, meanwhile, were taking

fire from two treelines while the gunships made low passes attempting to

suppress the enemy fire. The 9-5 were wounded-began to move down the slope, off

the ridge, as their aircraft began to bum, attempting to escape the enemy's

automatic weapons fire.

Lt Berry resumed and commenced his approach, orienting his helicopter sideways

to allow the gunner to fire the .50. He still did not know where the survivors

were as he proceeded below the ridgeline and moved his helicopter up the slope,

hugging the terrain. This made it possible for him to bring his aircraft as

close as possible while avoiding some of the automatic weapons fire from one of

the beelines. Even late in the approach, he still was unable to locate the

survivors until Capt McPheron's co-pilot, ILt T.R. Llewellyn, stood up in a bomb

crater where they were located and waved by crossing his arms. The mountainside

was extremely steep. Lt Berry was unable to land, and hovered with the right

main wheels on the mountainside as the downed crew and the recon team, under the

direction of the r con company's First Sergeant, J. L. Medvecky, crawled down

the hill and were pulled into the aircraft by the gunner, LCPL Sanders. Cpl

Wilson, the Crew Chief, fired from the door window because the .50 would not

elevate sufficiently up the hill. Lt Berry's co-pilot, ILt Andrew Parker, was

concerned that the rotor blades would strike the ground at any time due to the

steep gradient of the mountain. Bullets impacted into the ground around the

helicopter, particularly the area around the cockpit, but Lt Berry remained calm

and held his position. After a very uncomfortable length of time in the zone, it

appeared that all were aboard. Lt Parker raised the ramp, and Lt Berry took off,

dropping down the mountainside to gain airspeed. 20 minutes after EP-171 had

been shot down, the wounded were receiving medical treatment. The second recon

team was successfully inserted at 1420H at XD 745541, but extracted two hours

later due to contact and numerous sightings in the area.

By the end of the day, artillery support, which fired 632 rounds on the 27th,

was reorganized into an artillery group with two batteries: one in support of

each battalion, and a detachment of two 155mm howitzers and three 4.2" mortars

in general support. A i r support for 27 April consisted of 136,000 pounds of

ordnance, delivered primarily on Hill 861. The bombs consisted of 250 and

500pound mixtures along with 18,000 pounds of napalm.

HILL 861 TAKEN 28 April 1997

Plans for 28 Apr were to attack the area commanded by three key terrain

features: Objective #I was Hill 861 (XD 803443), Objective #2 was Hill 881-South

(XD 778438), and Objective #3 was Hill 881 -North (XD 775458). Battalion 2/3

south of Hill 861 was to seize Objective #1 after supporting arms had blasted it

on 28 Apr. Battalion 3/3 was to follow in the trace of 2/3 and then wheel to the

west in an arcing movement, securing the key terrain between Objectives # I and

#2 and attack and seize Objective #2 from a northeasterly direction. After

Objective # I was secured by 2/3 and thoroughly searched for enemy documents,

weapons, and equipment, and after Objective #2 had been secured, 2/3 was to

attack and seize Objective #3 from the east. Duration of the operation was

contingent on enemy resistance encountered.

On 28 Apr, 2/3 assaulted Objective #1, Hill 861 (XD 803443) with two companies

abreast (Co E and G) and secured it at 281630H encountering no enemy.

Between 1910H and 1840H, E/2/3 received sporadic mortar fire for a total of 19

incoming 60mm mortars, but suffered no casualties. 2/3 set in for the night with

the two assaulting companies remaining in the vicinity of the objective and the

command group and the remaining company to the south.

3/3, composed of a command group and three companies (M/3/3, K/3/9, and M/3/9),

moved overland from KSCB to occupy night positions on the southwestern flank of

2/3, with the command group and a company at XD 803427 and the remaining two

companies deployed to the west.

During the 28th, air dropped 382,700 pounds of ordnance, including 74,250 pounds

of ordnance and twelve 2,000-pound bombs (DELTA-4, M-84), while artillery fired

968 rounds in observed missions and 107 rounds as H&Is. In addition two Arc

Light strikes were conducted, centered at XD 955455 and XD 780530.

The Battle of the Hills had little to do with the local situation at Khe Sanh;

it was as though two enemy forces entered a virgin area and fought it out,

without regard to the local inhabitants.

Col Corson relates that some distance from all the action, several local

populace [he calls "Vietnamese" but were probably Bru tribesmen] were standing

beside a Marine radio jeep watching the fire-power rained upon 861. The day was

finally clear; the action was clearly visible. One of the locals asked a Marine

Major in the jeep why the assault forces continued to attack up a hill in the

face of enemy fire, and the Major, annoyed and yet holted by a primitive person

speaking English, sar

castically responded that that is where the enemy was! Then the local citizen

asked why the Marines did not use the tunnel running through the mountain,

attacking the enemy from the rear. The Major now became interested! But Hill 861

was already taken, and the Major angrily looked at the local man and asked why

he didn't mention the tunnel earlier. The man responded that he had not been

asked. He walked away. The real reason was that the local leader, Mr. Anya, had

attempted to speak with the Marines for 5 days, but the Marines, preoccupied

with the tactical situation, did not wish to speak with him. Hill 861 contained,

in fact, five natural caves.

CARING FOR EACH OTHER 29 April 1967

The attack began on 29 Apr as 3/3 moved toward Battalion Intermediate Objective

"A" (XD 782445). The lead element, M/3/9 became engaged in a draw at XD 792448

with an estimated enemy platoon 1120H to 130011 resulting in 2 Marines killed,

10 wounded, 2 NVA killed (confirmed) and 19 killed (probable).

Cpl Robert L. Allen, a squad leader with First Platoon, M/3/9, had just set his

squad in a defensive position when they began to receive heavy enemy small arms

and automatic weapons fire from entrenched enemy fortifications.

Two men were caught in the open and seriously wounded during the initial

exchange of fire. When he observed that they were unable to move, Cpl Allen,

with complete disregard for his own safety, dashed through the heavy enemy fire

to the wounded men and immediately carried one of them to safety.

Undaunted by the continuing hostile fire, he quickly returned to the remaining

Marines. Although he received a painful wound as he recrossed the open area, he

ignored his own injury to carry his companion to safety. Refusing medical

attention for himself, he skillfully directed accurate fire into the North

Vietnamese position while administering first aid to his wounded companions.

During this same action, Cpl Vincent M. Kowalewski and Cpl Wayne Kretler both

observed a wounded Marine in an open area, and unhesitatingly exposed themselves

to the heavy enemy fire to lift a wounded comrade to their shoulders and each

move one of their wounded comrades to a position of safety.

The platoon radioman of Second Platoon, LCPL Ira G.R. Johnson, II, spotted

several wounded Marines Iying in an open area within the enemy's killing zone

and unhesitatingly ran through the intense enemy automatic rifle and small arms

fire to a wounded comrade and calmly administered first aid while remaining

exposed to the enemy fire, and then carried the man to a place of relative

safety. Observing a corpsman attempting to bring another wounded Marine to

safety, he returned through the murderous enemy fire to assist the Marine to

safety.

LCPL Jerry M. Vanderhoff, observing his wounded companions Iying exposed to

hostile fire immediately moved through the heavy volume of enemy fire to a

position from which he could deliver effective 3.5" rocket fire at the enemy

positions. With complete disregard for his own safety, he repeatedly exposed

himself to the hostile fire as he fired white phosphorous rocket rounds into the

North Vietnamese positions, providing a smoke screen that enabled the Marine

casualties to be evacuated. Although painfully wounded, he refused medical

attention or evacuation until he had expended all his ammunition.

Directing the efforts of LCPL Vanderhoof was 2Lt Edward J. Kresty, a platoon

commander in M13/9 who saw that the lead elements of M-2, the point platoon, had

become detached from the rest of M-2. Several Marines had been seriously wounded

during the initial burst of fire. "It was then that I saw 2nd Lt Kresty

furiously move through this heavy fire to an exposed position forward of his

platoon. On the way up he moved from position to position. He must have

immediately realized what the situation was, because just as he reached the

exposed high ground, he began to give instructions to the cut off squad by radio

and because he could see from his exposed position he calmly directed the cut

off squad back to the platoon's position by another route and consolidated their

position. After this was accomplished and although he could have then returned

to a safe position he remained to draw fire while he directed the successful

evacuation of the wounded. After this was completed he still remained under this

heavy automatic fire to mark the enemy position with WP from a 3.5 rocket

launcher for supporting arms. During this time the artillery FO was seriously

wounded and unable to render any assistance so Lieutenant Kresty called in the

artillery fire mission on the enemy positions which was as close as 75 meters to

his own position. Lieutenant Kresty showed no concern at all for his own safety.

I am sure that if he did not react the way he did his platoon and the company

would have suffered heavy losses. 2d Lieutenant Kresty's knowledge and devotion

to duty saved the lives of many Marines that day, without any regard for his own

safety."

During this contact, the second element, M/3/3, passed to the south of the fire

fight and continued the attack toward the battalion objective, and secured

Objective "A" at 191' H, remaining in this position, about 600 - 700 meters

northeast of Hill 881-South, for the evening. At 19001, M/3/3 sighted 20 NVA

soldiers on Objective 2 moving in a western direction across the top of the

hill. In addition, two enemy mortar teams were sighed setting on Objective #2

and just to the west of M/3/3's position at XD 780444.

Capt David G. Rogers of C Battery, 1/12, recalls the Commanding Officer of Co M,

Capt Bennett, ".. called me over. I was standing about 15 meters from him-and he

told me what he was doing and he said, 'Look, Dave, there's a North Vietnamese

up on top of that hill up there. Get some arty up there real fast.' So I think

that was about the fastest fire mission I ever fired in my life. I think we got

rounds up there within a matter of two minutes or less.. And I can still

remember real vividly the sound of these rounds coming over our heads. You could

really hear them whistling... The Company Commander was constantly calling for

more and more artillery on top of the hill."

Countermortar fire was brought to bear immediately, permitting the enemy to fire

only four rounds of 82mm before being dispersed. At 20151, M/3/3 sighted an

estimated NVA company advancing towards its position. Artillery with VT fuze was

called in on noise and lights resulting in screams of pain among the enemy.

M/3/3 remained on the intermediate objective during the night with no further

contact. The remainder of 3/3 was to the east, near XD 792442, within support

and reinforcement range of the lead company. 2/3 encountered no contact and only

one sighting during the day. The search of Objective #1, Hill 861, yielded two

enemy bodies with ID cards, numerous items of enemy equipment, and two AK47

assault rifles, along with the bodies of 4 previously unrecovered Marine KlAs.

2/3's nighttime positions ranged from the top of Objective #I to the west.

Hill 861 was found to be well fortified with bunkers constructed from bamboo,

dirt and grass. Some of the bunkers were as much as six feet thick and wee

capable of receiving direct artillery hits without suffering internal damage.

Approximately 25 bunkers and 62 fighting holes were found on top of Hill 861,

all mutually supporting and very well camouflaged. A total of 400 fighting holes

were counted on Hill 861 and the ridges to the north and west. Defenses weer

primarily oriented toward the finger running up the hill from the south. Mortar

positions were found on the reverse slope (northwest) laid in the direction of

KSCB. If all the positions had been occupied at one time, Hill 861 could have

held two NVA companies plus supporting arms. The battle area was extremely well

policed by the enemy; virtually no equipment or information of intelligence

value remained. Due to the large amount of ordnance expended on Hill 861 many of

the positions were destroyed or buried. The odor of dead and decaying bodies was

strong. As a result of the massive supporting arms brought to bear on Hill 861,

the 18th NVA Regiment was severely mauled and was relieved by the 95th Regiment

of the 325C Division, which defended Hills 881-South and 881-North during the

remainder of the battle.

The remaining regiment of the 325C Division, the 101st, remained in reserve near

Highway 9 in Laos.

The 18th NVA Regiment had been a well-disciplined force, well entrenched in

bunkers and caves. Their camouflage was such that attacking Marines were within

their position before realizing it. They survived artillery and air strikes and

were not routed until 1000 and 2000 pound bombs with delayed fuzes were used

against" them. Enemy fire discipline and marksmanship were excellent. Many

Marine casualtries were shot through the head and upper body. The enemy force on

861 had been supported by snipers, .50 and .30 caliber MGs, 60mm and 82mm

mortars on 861 and from XD 798446, XD 806446, and XD 778444. When 2/3 secured

the hill, the Marine KlAs which had been left during the fighting were found

stripped of all equipment.

Supporting arms for 29 Apr included 195,000 pounds of airdelivered ordnance

including 40,000 pounds of napalm and a mixture of 250 to 2000 pound bombs.

Artillery fired 2040 rounds during the day, primarily in support of M/3/9's

morning contact and M/3/3's evening contact. Air recon of the area to the west

of Hill 881-South and 881North disclosed a large number of previously

undiscovered enemy positions, including 12 .50 cal. positions.

CONFLICT, CARNAGE, CONQUEST 30 April 1967

Capt David Rogers, of M/3/3, recalls the day: "The weather on the morning of

April 30, 1967, was beautiful, not

a cloud in the sky and one could see for miles. There was no fog, smog, or air

pollution that far away from civilization. Only North Vietnamese soldiers, Bru

Montagnards, US Marines, and wild animals roamed those picturesque mountains,

even tigers. The only things visible were Marines as the NVA had expertly

camouflaged themselves on Hill 881 -South under the protection of intermittent

fog... I should have figured that everything was going to go to hell after

calling in a fire mission just prior to starting up the hill. I called for white

phosphorus marking rounds before calling for high explosive. I was lucky I did

as the first round whistled by real close and nearly hit a couple of Marines in

front of us. I told the command group that I felt the battery at KSCB had made

an error in azimuth computations. The battery was alerted and told to recheck

their data. They admitted a human error had been made and said the error would

be corrected by battery personnel. For the remainder of the day, subsequent

rounds would land where called for."

On the morning of 30 Apr, shortly after first light, H/2/3 moved into the area

of M/319's contact of 29 Apr (XD 791449). The enemy allowed Co H to move to

within 100 meters of their bunkers and then opened up with .50s as well as

sniper rifles with high powered scopes. There were an estimated 50 NVA soldiers

dug in bunkers to their front and 15 on theirleftflankatXD791447. The company

immediately began taking heavy casualties from the intense crossfire of an

estimated two enemy platoons at XD 793446. Second and Third Platoons of H/2/3

were immediately pinned down and took heavy casualties. H-2 had set up a base of

fire on a small ridge less than 100 meters from the enemy emplacements

while 11-3 had moved over the forward slope of the ridge into a draw where the

North Vietnamese opened up from well concealed and highly fortified positions.

ILt David Spencer Hackett, the Co XO, was in a depression from where he could

observe the source of the enemy fire. He charged 30 meters through a hail of

murderous fire to direct the fire of a M-60 MG team near him against the enemy

bunker firing on them.

LCPL Gary Eugene Mettler, a machinegunner attached to H-2, ignored the heavy

volume of enemy fire and moved his MG to a vantage point to provide optimal fire

support for his platoon. While moving across the fireswept terrain, he was

painfully wounded. He refused medical evacuation and succeeded in emplacing his

weapon and delivering accurate suppressive fire against the hostile positions.

Despite his painful injury, he continued to fire his weapon until he was out of

ammunition. Still under fire, he ran to a wounded Marine, retrieved the

ammunition he was carrying, and continued to bring fire on the enemy. Only after

friendly artillery had silenced the enemy position did LCPL Mettler consent to

have his wound treated.

Although 2Lt Bruce Edwin Griesmer, the Platoon Commander of Second Platoon, was

seriously wounded in the initial burst of fire, he continued to command the

situation by skillfully maneuvering his men to more advantageous positions and

directing the delivery of a heavy volume of fire on the hostile force.

Continuously refusing medical evacuation, he continued commanding the situation,

providing covering fire for the evacuation of the wounded and dead until,

overcome with pain and loss of blood, he lost consciousness. One of the Navy

corpsmen, HN Richard L. Kinney, rushed forward through the intense enemy

crossfire, moving from one injured Marine to another to attend their wounds.

While thus serving his fellowmen, he was killed by the enemy.

With the other corpsmen also wounded, Cpl Mark Leroy Black moved to the side of

one of the corpsmen, retrieved his Unit One, and began rendering medical aid to

the casualties. Disregarding his own safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to

the hostile fire as he moved from one casualty to another, administering aid and

comforting the wounded. Subsequently he organized several stretcher teams and

helped carry the wounded to safety. Several Marines lived because of Cpl Black's

actions.

Cpl Thomas Lance Brewer, a squad leader of H/2/3, noticed that one of his men

had a serious wound, and moved through the heavy hostile fire to assist him.

While attempting to move the casualty, Cpi Brewer was himself wounded in his

arm, but, ignoring his painful injury, remained with the Marine to provide

protective fire until further assistance arrived and the man was moved to a

position of relative safety.

PFC Eugene Wall noticed a Marine trapped at the point, seriously wounded, and

unhesitatingly moved through the heavy volume of fire to render aid to his

comrade and carry him to a place of relative safely. Throughout the fire fight,

PFC Wall repeatedly moved across the fire-swept terrain to assist his wounded

companions and move them to covered positions.

ILt Hackett, constantly moving through one of the pinned-down platoons to

organize the evacuation of the seriously wounded, sent his radioman to the

Company Commander, Capt Raymond C. Madonna, since his radioman had been killed.

Without means to communicate with the base of fire extablished by H-2, he rose

from his position of safety despite the heavy enemy fire hitting around him, to

direct fire from the base of fire. While moving, he was killed by an enemy

rifleman.

PVT Michael Makovec of 3.5" rockets, disregarded his own safety and moved

through a heavy volume of fire to a vantage point to deliver accurate rocket

fire against an enemy MG which was inflicting numerous casualties. Repeatedly

exposing himself to hostile fire, he continued to fire his weapon until the MG

was destroyed.

H/2/3 pulled back with its casulaties and cleared the area for close air support

strikes. Results of the fire fight were: 9 Marines KIA, 43 WIA (29 evacuated),

14 NVA KIA (confirmed) and another 25 probables.

E/2/3, meanwhile, moved on the left flank of H/2/3, receiving several rounds of

sniper fire during Company H's contact. E/2/3 continued its advance unhindered

to the southern approaches of Objective #3, Hill 881-North. The company spotted

enemy troop movement (at XD 780451 ) at I 1 40H and at 161 OH took the enemy

under fire while calling in gunships and air. At 1700H, E/ 2/3 (at XD 778452)

received small arms fire from XD 782449 wounding 5 Marines.

The Third Platoon of E/2/3 had the mission of seizing the high ground on the

right flank of the company objective when it suddenly came under intense small

arms and automatic weapons fire and was pinned down. When he observed the

wounded separated from the rest of the platoon and exposed to continuing hostile

fire, Hospitalman John Charles Burke, Jr., completely disregarded his own safety

as he dashed through the heavy volume of fire to aid the fallen Marines.

Despite the concentrated enemy fire, he moved from one man to another,

skillfully administering first aid and evacuating them to the safety of covered

positions during the 3-hour battle. On one occasion he was unable to move a

Marine who had lost a considerable amount of blood. He fearlessly lay in a prone

position shielding the Marine while he gave him medical aid, undoubtedly saving

the man's life.

Simultaneously, Third Platoon's Right Guide, Cpl Robert Paul Foreit, began to

maneuver to the wounded, using his own body as a shield to protect the wounded

and a corpsman, HN Ronald E. Mclntyre. When rounds from the enemy fire landed

only inches away, Cpl Foreit remained very calm and joked and talked to the

wounded Marines to bolster their morale. When he located other casualties time

and time again he gave cover to HN Mclntyre so he could reach and treat the

wounded. He then carried some of the casualties to a safer location. [A few days

later, on 3 May, while rushing to the aid of a wounded Marine, Foreit was

painfully wounded and evacuated].

Gunships were called to neutralize the enemy, and the casualties were

successfully extracted. At 1927H, E/2/3 reported receiving sporadic small arms

fire from XD 774453, to their northwest and reported its troops heard a warning

device making a "beep" sound everytime an aircraft passed over the area bounded

by Hill 861, 881 -South, and 881North. As a result of their contacts, E/2/3 drew

in tight within their perimeter at XD 778452 for the night as H&ls were fired

into the area. At mid-afternoon, after travelling one and a half hours through

extremely dense foliage, G/2/3 arrived at the area where H/2/3 had had contact

in the morning and withdrew in order to blast the area with supporting arms. The

attack position was a small ridge line about 300 meters from the top of a very

steep but nearly barren hill which lay in front of them, about one click

northwest of Hill 861.

At this point, the First Platoon, G/2/3, moved two squads down to the base of

the incline and got on line to assault the hill. One squad, Second, remained on

the ridge line to be used as a base of fire in order to provide close support as

the remainder moved into an extremely precarious situation, half crawling, half

walking, up the bomb-riddled slope.

The move was without incident until they came to the crest, at which time the

assaulting elements came under intense fire from automatic weapons and extremely

accurate sniper fire form the top of the hill, about 75 meters to their front.

Despite heavy supporting arms, the enemy was still in the area. It was

frighteningly eerie: "The ammo had no noise to them.. We couldn't hear the

rounds go off- we-just bodies falling down, making it hard to distinguish where

these rounds were being fired from. The best way we thought to assault the

position was throwing a lot of hand grenades."

Immediately there were casualties. LCPL Rodin spotted an enemy bunker, but had

trouble with his weapon and crouched in a kneeling position too long while

attempting to clear it. An enemy sniper shot him in the leR lung and leR

shoulder.

Another casualty, PFC Yizzerea, was shot through the neck and bled profusely.

SSgt Ruben Santos came to his aid, placing his finger inside the bullet hole and

greatly reduced the flow of blood. The platoon corpsman, HN David L. Boucher,

later declared that this immediate action undoubtedly saved PFC Yizzerea's life.

When the corpsmen arrived, SSgt Santos resumed his duties as platoon sergeant as

the attacking squads sought what little protection the crest of the hill

afforded. It was noted at this time that approximately a squad of the enemy was

dug-in on top of the hill in bunkers and spider holes which had withstood a

continuous barrage of heavy bombs and artillery that early morning. They were

armed with automatic weapons, including a MG and sniper rifle. It was evident

that these enemy remained behind to delay the advance, a suicidal attempt to

kill as many Marines as possible, thereby covering their retreating main force.

It was about 1830H and darkness was fast approaching as the two assault squads

lay pinned down just beneath the crest of hill. At this time, 2Lt Peter M.

Hesser decided to use the squad on his right as a base of fire and move the left

squad further left and higher on the hill so they could assault across the front

of the enemy. The squad on the right threw grenades and on command the squad on

the left assaulted across the front, killing several of the enemy in their holes

and bunkers.

The enemy were entrenched, having a wide field of fire. SSgt Santos, unconcerned

for his own life, went from bunker to bunker, spraying the area with rounds and

throwing grenades. At one time he caught a live grenade and dropped it into an

enemy bunker, one which was facing the Marines advancing up the hill, saving

many Marines' lives.

PFC Michael T. Mills, also maneuvering through the enemy fire, threw a hand

grenade inside an enemy bunker, killing the enemy soldier and enabling his unit

to continue to the top of the hill. When he spotted an enemy MG, he and LCPL

Robert G. Cameron aggressively attacked the bunker and destroyed it with a hand

grenade. Cpl David M. Coleman also was attacking the enemy bunkers and spider

holes, exposing himself to enemy fire while throwing hand grenades into the

occupied holes. Due to twilight, several of the spider traps were passed

unnoticed as the hilltop was seized and the platoon established a 360°

perimeter.

At this time, Cpl Coleman saw Cpl Richard Travis Schmitz being pulled into an

enemy bunker. Cpl Coleman, without delay, jumped in front of the bunker, grabbed

ahold of Cpl Schmitz and attempted to pull his body free. The NVA inside,

shooting through Cpl Schmitz's body, wounded Cpl Coleman in 5 different places,

knocking him to the ground. Although shot in his legs, Cpl Coleman again crawled

back trying to aid Cpl Schmitz, whom he thought was still alive. At this time,

SSgt Santos arrived and Coleman was brought back to be treated by the platoon

corpsman.

SSgt Santos, disregarding his own safety, fearlessly advanced and tied a line to

the man's legs. As he attempted to pull the Marine from the hole, the enemy

soldiers fired through the casualty's body, inflicting flash burns on SSgt

Santos' face and hands. Realizing that Schmitz had succumbed to his wounds and

that further attempts to clear the bunker in the darkness would cause additional

casualties, he ordered his men to cover the bunker with logs and block all

exits. On the following morning, investigation of the bunker revealed two dead

enemy soldiers, one still alive-alive because he sat on a grenade; it blew off

his ass, but he was still alive.

G/2/3 had sustained two killed and nine wounded in this action, and set in for

the night at XD 789449.

On the morning of 30 April, M/3/3, prior to its assault on Objective #2, Hill

881-South, commenced a search of the adjacent draw in which the enemy troops had

been massing on the preceeding night prior to the artillery saturation with VT

fuse (at XD 778446). While in the area, elements of the company located 5 NVA

bodies and 2 NVA wounded. One of the wounded NVA attempted to escape and was

killed; the second was captured but later died from previously inflicted wounds.

Prior to M/3/3's search of the draw, K/3/9 at 0615H had commenced movement from

its nighttime position to link up with

M/3/3. The company linked up with the rear elements of M/3/3 at 0815H, while the

lead elements of M/3/3 attacked Objective #2 at 0800H. The assault by M/3/3 was

led by Capt Raymond H. Bennett of Columbus, Ohio, Commanding Officer of a Marine

detachment on USS ENTERPRISE who had requested TAD [Temporary Additional Duty]

assignment in order to participate in the Khe Sanh operation. The CO of M/3/3,

Capt Griggs, was on R&R.

The attack plan called for First Platoon, led by Lt Billy D. Crews, to move to

the top of the hill, turn right along the ridgeline, while 3d Platoon, led by Lt

Joseph Robert Mitchell, Jr., would follow in trace and turn leR. Lt. Douglas

Houser's training 2nd Platoon would provide the base of fire and reserve

reinforcement to the lead platoons.

Hill 881-South consists of two high knolls with a saddle between, and several

fingers sloping downward from the hill. The NVA occupied the hill with a

battlion minus. [Note: the sizes of NVA units are greatly different than USMC. A

NVA Division contains approx. 6,000 or more; a NVA Regiment approx 1,500, a NVA

Battalion 400, a NVA company approx. 100, and a platoon, 30.] Both peaks were

defensive strongpoints employing perimeter defenses, while a lineal defense was

employed between the knolls. Defensive positions also extended down the fingers

to the northeast, north, and west. Both strong points had a CP but the main CP

was on the western peak. Communication wire ran from the CP to three mortar pits

on the hill at XD 778444 and to three mortar pits on the western side of the

hill. An estimated platoon occupied each of the knolls at XD 778444, XD 764443,

and XD 773423.

For the Marines of M/3/3, the threat contained on Hill 881South was anything but

obvious. Artillery had fired on it all night. But what was up there?

Capt David G. Rogers, an artillery offcer of C Battery, 1/12, was with Capt

Raymond H. Bennett, the Company Commander, ILt Joseph A. Cialone, the XO, and

assigned radio operators: "..we didn't know exactly what was up on Hill 881

[south!. It was a real deceiving place to be in.. If somebody were to have told

me that there was an entire battalion of North Vietnamese up on top of that

hill, I think I would have looked at him and told him he was crazy. First of

all, you couldn't really see any signs of North Vietnamese up there. We know

there was people up there because we had seen them the night before. However,

like I say, a larger unit, a battalion-sized unit, up on top of that hill-I just

couldn't imagine it. We could see some bunkers, I'd say at the very most I saw

probably five bunkers.. The rest were so well camouflaged, expertly camouflaged,

that the average Marine couldn't see them unless we actually walked up on the

position itself."

At 0830H, M/3/3 sighted 4 NVA soldiers on Objective #2 and called in artillery

with unknown results. By 1025H the leading platoon of M/3/3, led by Lt Billy D.

Crews, had reached the top of Objective #2, Hill 881-South, on the western end

(XD 778438) and began moving east on top of the hill, receiving sporadic small

arms fire. Lt Crews reported it was nothing he couldn't handle, and Capt Bennett

ordered him to keep pressing eastward. At this time, Lt Crews ran into heavy

opposition, and another platoon, led by Lt Houser, was dispatched to reinforce.

With the second platoon joining them, the company closed on the enemy and was

hit by heavy fire from a well dug-in enemy in heavily camouflaged positions and

by sniper fire from individual riflemen located in trees. The two platoons also

received 30 rounds of 82. The platoons were trapped, unable to advance or

withdraw. The North Vietnamese had permitted the Marines to advance past their

bunkers while going up the hill. They had excellent fire discipline. When the

Marines attempted to come down the hill the same way they advanced, the North

Vietnamese opened up on them. They could not move. The battle was to last some 6

hours.

A special problem with Hill 881-South was the use of artillery. The only

friendly artillery that could support Marines on 881South were 155 howitzers.

These at KSCB were the old towed-type howitzers requiring a considerable amount

of time to shift action, especially in the very muddy conditions then

prevailing, usually about half an hour.Capt David Rogers "..was with the command

group which consisted of the company commander, executive officer, their radio

operators, and my radio operator. The CO maintained radio contact with the

platoon leaders as their platoons begdan the ascent. The firing of weapons was

sporadic at first as the Marines of Mike Company advanced forward. A few

explosions could be heard (grenades) and first reports via radio indicated only

light resistance was being encountered and that the situation could be handled.

I don't know how far up the hill the Marines had advanced before everything just

seemed to explode on the north side of the hill. They got pinned down and

couldn't be seen by the command group. The noise level increased sharply and

reports started coming in via radio that resistance was extremely heavy. It was

soon apparent that Mike Company had walked into a death trap. A perfect ambush

had been executed and for those on the hill there was no way back down safely as

they had become surrounded and victims of murderous crossfire. The hunters had

suddenly become the hunted. Reports of Marine casualties came in including the

death of a platoon leader, a friend of mine. [Lt "Buzzy" Mitchell]. Finally,

only one radio was transmitting from the top of the hill to the command group.

It appeared nearly impossible to coordinate the assault with the number of

casualties being suffered.

"At the same time the command group had clustered together in a bomb crater

located at the edge of a ring of death which had begun to fill with dead and

wounded Marines and NVA soldiers. The crater provided some protection except for

the mortar rounds which had begun to drop around us. One landed in front of us

and about a minute or so later one

landed behind us. To an artilleryman, that's called 'bracketing'- the next round

lands in the middle of where the first two landed, which was where we were

located. Fortunately, it never came, but I kept expecting it to show up for a

long time. I knkew if it landed in the bomb crater we would all be dead."

"I remember seeing from the command position one black Marine close to us

charging up the slope of the hill when suddenly a mortar round went off behind

him. He buckled at the knees, remained stationary with both knees planted on the

ground for about 10 seconds, and then suddenly got up and kept moving forward. I

thought for sure he had been seriously injured, but apparently the shrapnel had

blown away from him and only the concussion from the explosion had momentarily

stunned him."

Disregarding his own personal safety, 2Lt Billy Derrell Crews, Platoon Commander

of First Platoon, M/3/3, the point element, led his men up the hill, becoming

wounded from a mortar in the assault. Despite his wounds and the continuous

mortar attack, Lt Crews repeatedly moved up and down the hill to assist in

carrying his wounded Marines to safety, exposing himself to enemy fire each

time.

During this time, Cpl Bernard G. Elkins, Right Guide of First Platoon, M/3/3,

repeatedly went from positon to position to provide battle dressings to his men.

When the suply of battle dressings was exhausted, Cpl Elkins ran from position

to position, under heavy fire, gathering all extra battle dressings and then

returned to use them on the wounded. In the process he himself was wounded in

the chest and arm. He was moved to the LZ for evacuation but insisted on

gathering extra

ammunition as he moved along and then carrying it back to his platoon and

distributing it among the troops. He was instrumental in calming the wounded by

talking with each man. He refused to be medically evacuated until all the other

casualties had been loaded aboard.

The thick vegetation and intense enemy fire had resulted in the various squads

of Lt Crews' First Platoon to become separated. One squad was forced to seek

cover several meters in advance of the remainder of the platoon where it

remained some 5 hours. The increasing intensity of the bitterly contested

engagement saw several enemy assaults quickly deplete the remaining ammunition

supply of this advance squad. The squad, like the platoon, could neither move

forward nor withdraw without producing many casualties. In addition, they had

taken several casualties which made it even more difficult to move.

Realizing the necessity of rendering assistance and supplying the advance squad

with critically needed ammunition, PFC Dorsey Burwin Williams unhesitatingly

exposed himself to the enemy fire by crawling forward with ammunition. Advancing

only a few meters, PFC Williams sustained a painful shoulder wound, but refused

to return to safety despite being urged to do so, and continued forward.

Approximately 10 meters from the advance squad PFC Williams threw several

magazines of ammunition to them, while at the same time, enemy soldiers rushed

from the thick foliage. Reacting quickly, PFC Williams wounded the enemy

soldiers, but before he could again fire, the enemy soldier fired a burst of

automatic weapons fire into his head, killing him.

The Second Platoon of M/3/3 was assigned the mission of moving up Hill 881-South

and securing the left flank. Fire from one particular enemy bunker was

inflicting heavy casualties and halted the advance of Second Platoon.

PFC Randy McPhee [2nd Fire Team, 2nd Plt, M/3/3] was on the point and got off

the first shot, which triggered an ambush, killing him and the next three

Marines within seconds. "Randy McPhee, our pointman-that was his second tour of

duty there. Just before we went into this particular battle-he was considered a

'Marine's Marine' kind of thing- but he fell down before the Sergeant there and

cried and begged him not to go to this particular fight because, he said, 'If I

go, I'm going to die.' And it kinda shook us all up because we knew he was no

coward. But he went, took two rounds in the chest." Due to intense hostile fire,

his unit was forced to withdraw, leaving his body behind (at XD 776438). [During

the next two days, after the hill had been subjected to intense artillery fire

and aerial bombing, when the Marines returned to recover remains of those killed

on 30 Apr, none of the remains recovered were identified as those of PFC McPhee.

He was MIA]

Realizing the necessity of eliminating the position, LCPL James H. Whisenhunt, a

rocket squad leader with M/3/3, on his own initiative, advanced into an exposed

area, a clear field of fire, and commenced to deliver accurate and effective

M-79 rounds on the enemy. Scoring a direct hit, he then advanced across an open,

exposed area to secure and destroy the bunker completely. In the process, enemy

MG fire inflicted fatal wounds on LCPL Whisenhunt.

SSgt Karol R. Bauer was approaching the crest of the hill when he began warning

his comrades to remain back and take

cover as he heard mortars pop from their tubes. His warning was responsible for

saving many lives as moments later an enemy mortar barrage saturated the Marine

advance. ARer the barrage, SSgt Bauer rushed to assist the casualties to points

of safety. While assisting one Marine, an enemy sniper mortally wounded him.

The numerous casualties kept the attached Navy corpsmen frenetically moving from

one to another in the area of bullets and mortars. Petty Officer Henry Cornell

Steward's actions were typical. Fearlessly and repeatedly exposing himself to

the hostile fire, he rushed through open area on three different occasions to

assist movement of wounded Marines to places of relative safety, administering

first aid and speaking words of encouragement. His professional ability and

quick thinking helped to save the lives of 10 Marines that were seriously

wounded and who would otherwise have died.

Although pinned down, the Marines were not by any means cowering. Typical of all

was PFC Thomas Burrlan Knapp who moved his mortar to a dangerously exposed

vantage point and, holding the weapon in position with his bare hands, began

delivering accurate fire against the NVA. When his assistant gunner was killed,

PFC Knapp continued to deliver effective fire unassisted until he sustained a

painful head wound. Despite his wound, he refused medical evacuation and

administered first aid to the other casualties.

Cpl Robert J. Schley, a MG team leader attached to First Platoon, moved his team

to an advantageous firing position on his own initiative by moving across an

open clearing and was able to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy.

After several hours of fighting, the gun was low on ammunition and Cpl Schley

dashed from hole to hole, again under heavy fire, trying to locate additional

ammunition. Although successful, he was painfully wounded in his shoulder.

Refusing medical evacuation, he returned to his gun position as the only

remaining member of his team able to fire. He continued to fire effectively on

the enemy and then received a serious neck wound. Although profusely bleeding,

he continued to fire, halting numerous enemy assaults until he died from loss of

blood and his wounds.

Third Platoon was sent to assist Second Platoon and secure the eastern half of

the hill. They, too, came under heavy fire and took numerous casualties,

including the platoon commander. Don Hossack, radioman for the fallen Platoon

Commander, 2Lt Joseph Robert Mitchell, laid the Lt across his legs, holding him

and feeling for the carotid artery and looking up and listening for the

gunships. The scene became the basis for a sculpture for a Vietnam Memorial in

San Antonio, Texas by Austin Deuel. The Lt had only a tiny piece of shrapnel in

his left cheek bone which evidently deflected right up into his brain.

Reacting instantly, 2Lt Douglas Houser organized the remainder of both platoons

into an effective fighting force and, rallying his men, directed and encouraged

them to continue the assault.

During the ensuing 6-hour battle, he repeatedly exposed himself to the intense

hostile fire to coordinate the advance of his men while he simultaneously

supervised the medical evacuation of all casualties and assisted in their

evacuation.

While Lt Houser organized both platoons, SSgt Terrance Leo Meier immediately

assumed command of the platoon upon the death of the platoon commander.

Subsequently, becoming separated from his platoon, he remained with 6 seriously

wounded companions and provided protective fire for them until he was able to

move the men to a captured enemy bunker. From here, despite continuous incoming

enemy fire, he called in artillery fire on the enemy force. Then he called in 81

mm WP rounds to cover their movement.

During this time, Cpl Larry M. Smith led his squad from the Third Platoon,

M/3/3, to assist the point elements. Dangereously exposing himself to the

intense enemy fire, he led his squad and maneuvered them into positions whereby

the lead elements could be effectively supported by fire, until he was fatally

wounded by incoming mortar fire.

HM3 Charles Allen Halstead, a Navy Corpsman of the Third Platoon, quickly moved

to the position wherer most of the casualties were located and, under heavy

fire, moved from man to man to treat their wounds. Evacuation of the wounded was

undertaken under heavy enemy fire, but despite the mortar and enemy sniper fire,

HM3 Halstead refused to leave until all of his patients had been evacuated

first.

The battle was, after all, a maker of the people. Capt Raymond H. Bennett,

commanding M/3/3, observed:

"The most impressive thing I saw is the actions of the American youngster. The

same long haired kid that loves rock and roll music and sometimes appears to the

public to be a weak generation, comes through with flying colors when the chips

are down. "At one point I ran across a couple of men badly shot up. It was

obvious to me-and to them-that they were dying. Yet there was no screaming or

crying or moaning. They only gave good information to newly arriving troops on

the locations of enemy targets such as machine guns."

The overwhelming volume of enemy fire made it apparent that M/3/3 must disengage

in order to permit supporting arms, particularly air, to reduce the objective.

Although the hill had been heavily bombarded, many of the bunkers remained

intact or only lightly damaged. Additional heavy bombardment was essential prior

to continuation of the attack.

Capt David Rogers with the M/3/3 CP in the bomb crater saw the survivors: "The

Marines started trickling back off the hill slowly. Some were visible to the

command group as they approached us carrying the wounded. I recall seeing one

Marine whose breasts appeared to have been almost shot off, apparently shot at

and hit from a 90° angle. Another half of an inch and surely he, too, would have

been among the dead. I remember seeing one Staff Sergeant [SSGT Terrence Leo

Meier], an outstanding NCO and leader, carrying one of his wounded men piggyback

along with two rifles. He was cursing as he stomped back off the hill. His

bitterness about what had happened was very apparent. He was later nominated for

the Congressional Medal of Honor. He never did receive it, and died a few months

later of meningitis in a Naval hospital in DaNang." First Platoon, M/3/9, was

sent to assist in the evacuation of casualties and came under heavy fire; the

enemy attempted to prevent the link-up by pouring heavy blocking fire between

the two Marine units.

Cpl Milton P. Vasquez, knowing it was too dangerous to lead his squad across

without covering fire, dashed across the open, fireswept area, and

single-handedly laid a base of fire which enabled his men to cover the distance

with relative safety.

The reinforcing unit nevertheless took many casualties. Numerous acts of heroism

were involved in caring for and rescuing them.

Hospitalman Michael A. House continuously maneuvered across the fire-swept area

to the side of his wounded comrades. Realizing that the casualties urgently

required medical treatment prior to being moved, he courageously remained

exposed to the enemy fire and skillfully administered first aid. Repeatedly, he

placed himself in the most dangerous positions to care for the wounded.

PFC Vernon W. Metcalf fearlessly moved through the heavy volume of enemy fire to

carry a casualty to a place of relative safety, himself becoming wounded as he

did so. Ignoring his painful injury, he refused to be medevaced, and throughout

the attack repeatedly exposed himself to the intense hostile fire to assist

evacuation of other wounded Marines and their gear.

LCPL Karl G. Gimple repeatedly crawled through an open field which was under

heavy MG and mortar fire to reetrieve several dead and wounded Marines as well

as their gear. While carrying an injured Marine to the medical collection point,

Cpl Gimple was wounded in the neck and shoulder. Ignoring his painful injuries,

he resolutely completed carrying the wounded Marine to safety. Upon reaching